3. Proof of the Conclusions

a. Proof of the First Conclusion

31. The proof of the first conclusion [n.28] is that what is per se signified by the word ‘accident’ is a certain respect as to that of which it is an accident, and perhaps it is the same respect that is introduced by the term ‘inhering’ as to what it inheres in. And the thing signified by accident and by accident-ness (so to speak) and by what inheres and inherence is the same. Therefore, just as it is impossible for there to be an accident-ness that is not an inherence (if actually, actually; if aptitudinally, apititudinally), so the fact that something is an accident (speaking of what is per se and first signified by the this word) cannot not be inherent proportionally - that is, if actually actually, if aptitudinally aptitudinally.

32. And if you ask what genus that belongs to which per se signifies what is meant by ‘accident’ and ‘inhering’, I reply that it belongs to a genus of extrinsically arising respect. For it is plain that it states a respect, because its idea cannot be understood by itself. And it does not state a respect that comes from within, because it does not state what necessarily follows the positing of the extreme terms; for, as will be plain in the final conclusion [nn.39-42], its foundation and term can persist without the respect.

33. If you ask what genus it should be reduced to, perhaps to the genus of ‘passion’ [Categories 9.11b1-14], so that in this way passion states not only the respect of the passive thing to the agent, but to the form, or possibly perhaps to the genus of ‘action’ [ibid.], so that in this way action states not only the respect of the agent to the patient, but of the informing form to that which is informed. But in either way it will be a respect coming from outside.

34. And if you object that what belongs to a determinate genus cannot belong to several genera, but the term ‘accident’ or ‘inhering’, as far as concerns the per se idea of the word, belongs to all nine genera [n.35],     therefore etc     . - I reply that it is very possible that what belongs to a determinate genus denominates several genera; for perhaps ‘created thing’ states something that per se belongs to the genus of relation, and yet perhaps it denominates anything other than God, and only what is other than God is properly in a genus. So, therefore, this respect can belong per se to one genus, and yet it is denominatively said of the relations or respects of the nine genera.

35. But if it be objected against this, from Simplicius On the Categories [section on substance], that ‘is in’ does not constitute any special genus, because there is one ‘is in’ for all nine genera - I reply that either ‘is in’ is taken denominatively, and thus it encompasses all the genera of accidents, just as does that which is ‘inheres in’ or ‘is accident to’; or it is taken for the relation that is per se signified by ‘is in’, and in this way not just any accident is taken by ‘is in’, because it is a determinate species in one genus. But if Simplicius means that ‘is in’, as far as concerns the per se idea that it introduces, does not belong to any determinate genus but per se to several genera, he is to be rejected, for he is not of so great authority that the opposite of what reason concludes is, on his say-so, to be conceded. Now reason convincingly shows that the concept that ‘in’ introduces can be contained quidditatively in some genus, even though it be denominatively said of forms that are in many genera. For it is not said quidditatively of whiteness and line, because then whiteness and line would not be said for themselves, for that which essentially includes a relation is not for itself, according to Augustine On the Trinity 7.2 n.3.

b. Proof of the Second Conclusion

36. The proof of the second conclusion [n.29] is that a respect is essentially a relation between two extremes, therefore, just as to take away the term that the respect is to is to take away or destroy the idea of respect, so to take away that which the respect is of is to take away the respect itself and to destroy the idea of respect. Not therefore because a relational accident is an accident does it for this reason require a subject or foundation; but because a respect is a respect for this reason does it require that of which and to which it is a respect (even in the case of divine reality).

37. If it be argued against this [second] conclusion [n.29] that it seems to contradict the preceding one [n.28], because, according to the preceding conclusion, the idea that ‘to be accident to’ or to ‘inhere’ signifies is a respect coming from outside [n.32], therefore it cannot belong to any respect denominatively, because a respect is not a subject or a foundation of a respect (for then there would be a regress to infinity); therefore ‘paternity’ or ‘likeness’ cannot inhere in or be accident to, because ‘to inhere in’ or ‘to be denominated by inhering in’ requires that the thing denominated be the subject or foundation of the inhering in. I reply that one respect can well be founded on another, as posterior on prior (just as was touched on above in a question about character, and was proved about proportion and proportionality [Ord. IV d.6 nn.300-305]). And so I say that just as whiteness can be denominated from inhering in, or from what can be accidental to, so can paternity be denominated; and ‘like’ is a denomination in this regard.

38. But if you argue that therefore a respect is denominated by itself - the solution to this will be given in the third article [nn.39-45, cf. nn.67-68].

c. Proof of the Third Conclusion

39. The proof of the third conclusion [n.30] is that an absolute does not, from its being an absolute, require a term or terms, because then it would not be an absolute; therefore, if it requires a subject, this must be because of some other dependence essential to it; but there is no simply necessary dependence of any absolute on anything that is not of the absolute’s essence, save for dependence on the simply first extrinsic cause, namely on God.

40. Now a subject is not of the essence of an accident, because then ‘man is white’ would not be a being per accidens, which is against the Philosopher, Metaphysics 5.7.1017a7-22, 6.1015b16-26; 7.5.1030b14-27; for by adding to a thing what is of its essence one does not get a being per accidens, especially if that thing is in itself a being per se.

41. Now an accident in itself is a being per se, according to the Philosopher ibid. 5.7.1017a22-30; hence it is also per se in a genus. And a subject is not the simply first extrinsic cause of an accident, because God is not the subject of an accident. Therefore, the dependence of an absolute accident on a subject is not simply necessary (and I mean by simply necessary that whose opposite includes a contradiction). The proof of the major is that the first cause can perfectly supply the causality of any extrinsic cause with respect to any caused thing, because the first cause has in itself all such causality more eminently than a second does cause.

42. If you say ‘a subject is a material cause with respect to an accident, and God cannot supply the place of a material cause just as not of a formal cause either’ - on the contrary: according to the Philosopher, Metaphysics 8.4-5.1044b7-26, accidents do not have matter ‘from which’ but matter ‘in which’, or if they have matter ‘from which’ it is not a subject, because a subject along with an accident makes a being per accidens, as was said [n.40]. But what is per se intrinsic to the essence of an accident, whether matter or form, does not constitute a being per accidens, because an accident, as being a certain whole, arises from all the things that pertain to its essence.

43. From this reasoning it is clear why philosophers said that an accident cannot be without a subject; not indeed because they posited the subject to be of the essence of an accident (on the contrary, from these a being per accidens is constituted), nor because they posited inherence, or some or other respect to the subject, to be of the essence of an absolute accident (for it is a contradiction that some respect be included in the per se idea of an absolute, since then it would be absolute and non-absolute); but only because they posited an order of causes that was simply necessary, such that the first cause cannot cause what is caused by a second cause without that second cause. Now a subject does have some causality with respect to an accident, speaking of the natural order of causes. And so they denied that an accident, in the order of its causality they set down, exists without this cause. And to this extent is it said in Physics 1.4.188a9-10 that an intellect looking for the separation of accidents from subjects will be looking for things impossible. But the impossible is not that it include something repugnant to the first idea or quiddity of an absolute accident; for once such an impossible is posited, no rule for disputation can be preserved, especially as regard those consequents that are included along with their opposites in the antecedent. For it is plain that then, with such impossible thing posited, contradictories must at once be admitted. And thus, in the issue at hand, the greatest unacceptable result to which a respondent can be reduced is included, namely that of refutation.

44. But, as it is, the Philosopher in Physics 4.7.214a9-10 asks this question: if there were a space in which there was only color or sound, would it be a vacuum? And he replies definitively for one side, that if the space were receptive of a body it would be a vacuum. But if, from the primary understanding of what it is to be a color, a color’s being in a subject were included, then, since its subject could only be a body, from the first understanding of what was posed [sc. “if there were a space in which there was only color or sound, would it be a vacuum?”] one would get ‘a body is there’ and ‘a body is not there’; and so, once the hypothesis was posed, the response would at once have to be that the space would be a vacuum and not a vacuum.

45. The above discussion has been adduced for this purpose, so it may be seen that the Philosopher did not intend the contradiction to follow from the first quidditative idea of accident, just as neither did he posit ‘being in a subject’ to belong to the first quidditative idea of whiteness; but the impossibility he has is only because of the necessity he posits in the order of causes.